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INTRODUCTION
The controversy surrounding implementation of
the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) offers an
intriguing case study for better understanding the
political dynamics—and potential limitations—of
transpartisan coalitions. The Common Core was
originally promoted in 2010 by a centrist bi-partisan
coalition that included Democrats interested in
leveraging more rigorous academic standards to
improve educational opportunity and moderate probusiness Republicans concerned about workforce
development. As states moved to implement the
new Standards (and aligned assessments), an antiCommon Core coalition arose first on the far right
among Tea Party activists and then from the left,

particularly among teacher advocacy groups. From
the margins, opposition flowed into the mainstream.
While temporarily united by their opposition to
the CCSS, opponents across the political spectrum
did not agree on the sources of their concern or on
policy solutions. Understanding where the disparate
sides of this coalition agreed and disagreed on the
specific issue of the Common Core, and education
policy more generally, can shed light on the
conditions under which transpartisanship might
flourish and the extent to which these types of
coalitions can impact policy and remain aligned
over time.

THE ORIGINS AND POLITICAL THEORY OF THE
COMMON CORE
The Common Core is the latest in a series of
American education reforms intended to use
standards to leverage improvement (Supovitz &
Spillane, 2015). In the 1980s education reformers
emphasized minimum competency testing, but
the standards intended to be a floor quickly
became a ceiling. This spurred the systemic
reform movements of the 1990s in which reformers
advocated that states develop high standards and
aligned accountability systems, while maintaining
local flexibility. However, state standards and
assessment systems were of uneven quality and
rigor. Further, political pressure often pushed states
to adjust test pass rates to avoid public backlash.
Policymakers also learned that standards and
assessments alone did not catalyze the capacity
necessary for improving educational infrastructure.
The latest standards movement is an effort
to remedy many of these past weaknesses.
The Common Core State Standards (CCSS) in

mathematics and English language arts were
developed at the behest of the National Governors
Association (NGA) and the Council of Chief
State School Officers (CCSSO). The CCSS set
forth what students should know and be able
to do in mathematics and English language arts
at each grade level from Kindergarten to 12th
grade. Advocates argued that high, uniform
academic standards would improve the academic
performance of American students and better
prepare them for college and careers.
In many ways, Core proponents adopted a
technocratic view of education reform. They saw
America’s fragmented and varied approach to
public schooling and standards-setting as a barrier
to systemic innovation and improvement. They
believed that the country’s 50 states and over
15,000 school districts fostered incoherence and
stifled scalable innovation because the producers of
instructional materials (such as textbook publishers
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and software developers and assessment producers)
had to cater to small idiosyncratic markets rather
than leverage their resources to develop new
approaches at scale. This was the educational
theory of change for how the CCSS would bring
systemic reform to American schools.
Educational theories of change also require political
theories of action. Core advocates presented
national standards as a “common sense” solution
from experts which they hoped would repress
political opposition. This is a fairly common strategy
in American politics—anti-political politics—and
sometimes it works. But it also threatens a fairly
predictable reaction, in populist anti-elitism.
Standards advocates also believed that many states
needed incentives and support to build the systems
necessary, but that a direct federal mandate (grantin-aid condition) to adopt the Core would infuriate
people across the political spectrum and likely
doom the effort. The strategy that emerged went
to great lengths to emphasize the Standards as a
bipartisan (or even non-partisan) effort, pointing
to them as a product of governors rather than
national political leaders, and focused on speeding
the adoption process without direct federal

intervention. The standards were cast as “national
but not federal” with federal incentives (but not
requirements) for states to adopt them.
The carrots that the federal government used to
encourage states to adopt the Core were the Race to
the Top (RTTT) competitive grant competition and
the NCLB waiver application process. These carrots
were candied by circumstances, as the RTTT bounty
was made possible by the American Reinvestment
and Recovery Act stimulus funding due to the
2008 economic downturn. The U.S. Department of
Education No Child Left Behind waiver guidelines
also made it clear that adopting higher standards
(such as the Core) would make it much more likely
that waiver applications would be approved. The
nature of both of these application processes also
put governors and chief state school officers—who
tend to be more inclined to endorse systemic school
reforms irrespective of party affiliation—in charge
of drafting state applications, rather than more
change-adverse state legislatures. The federal
incentives were further supplemented by more
than $200 million in Gates Foundation money,
which went towards a plethora of state and local
political advocacy groups supporting CCSS adoption
(Layton, 2014).

IMPLEMENTING AND COMMUNICATING
THE CORE
For a while, this low-profile strategy worked. The
scope of conflict around the Core remained narrow
and the issue was relatively non-controversial. In
2010, 46 states and the District of Columbia adopted
the Core standards (McDonnell & Weatherford,
2013). Forty-four also initially signed on to use
one of the aligned assessments developed by the
Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College
and Careers (PARCC) and the Smarter Balanced
Assessment Consortium (SBAC) (Forgione, 2012).
What early opposition existed got scant attention
from the mainstream media (Rothman, 2011). This
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created the misimpression that the Standards
movement would proceed without substantial
controversy. Several Core advocates we interviewed
noted that the quiet early implementation period
and the lack of controversy contributed to a
perception of widespread support (Supovitz &
McGuinn, 2015), even though polls showed that
few Americans knew what the Core was at that
time (Maxwell, 2013). This resulted in a low sense
of urgency and relatively few resources expended
on defining a pro-Core message. “I think there
was a massive underinvestment in Common

3

Core advocacy between 2010 and 2012,” said one
advocacy group leader. Another Core advocacy
group leader noted,
Shame on us really, because it was very
naïve. There were always these handfuls
of people. . . harping about the standards.
But for two years that was it. It didn’t really
get much beyond that. And then all of a
sudden it just happened very fast that they
managed to sort of light a fire with the Tea
Party. … I think many of us would say we
expected there to be some backlash from
the right but not for it to be as politicized as
it eventually became.
As a consequence of the low profile of the CCSS,
the diverse array of organizations involved, and the
diffuse ownership of the standards the messages
of advocates were disconnected and discordant
(McGuinn 2015). “This is a fight that escalated
quickly that seemed to sort of overwhelm everyone
and … no one ever built any kind of coordinating
thing that stuck from the beginning with the right
people at the table that would meet and figure out
the strategy around this ….” said one Core advocacy

Although many of the pro-Common
Core groups knew each other
and had regular contact about
communications strategy, several
of our interview respondents felt
that there was not a systemic and
organized campaign to sway public
opinion.
group leader. Another similarly commented: “when
it became clear that there was going to be stiff
opposition people ran around throwing money
everywhere, you know, trying to play catch up and
there wasn’t …a lot of relationship building and
information building, not even a really clear sense
of like what do we need to do to win this? And what

would it look like? Unlike, say, the slow and steady
approach to advancing vouchers, or supporting
charter reform. You just can’t start up a movement
in short order from scratch.” Many attributed the
decline in support for the Core to the lack of a
coherent and coordinated messaging campaign in
the early 2010s.
There was no clarity about whose job it was to
communicate on behalf of the Common Core,
and little effort around grassroots engagement or
mobilization. The standards were created by the
National Governors Association and the Council
of Chief State School Officers, but as member
organizations with small staffs, they are neither
equipped nor culturally inclined to engage in largescale communications work with the general public.
Although many of the pro-Common Core groups
knew each other and had regular contact about
communications strategy, several of our interview
respondents felt that there was not a systemic
and organized campaign to sway public opinion.
As one advocacy group leader said, “We have not
mounted the kind of really expensive, concerted,
multi-million dollar public education campaigns
that might bring that silent majority in. I’m not
aware of anyone that has actually coordinated that.
And I think that’s one of the biggest challenges for
supporters of Common Core.”
The Hunt Institute, an education advocacy
organization and CCSS supporter, hosted a regular
conference call with CCSS proponents in an attempt
to better coordinate communication effort, but it
had little ability to push the unwieldy coalition to
take specific actions. By default, messaging fell
to state departments of education, which have
their own capacity issues and tend to be staffed by
technocrats; they developed a technocratic message
that fell on deaf ears. Advocates struggled to combat
the passionate ideological rhetoric of opponents
like Glenn Beck and Michelle Malkin with reasoned
arguments about the Core’s benefits.
Similarly, our interviews revealed that the two
assessment consortia (PARCC and SBAC) focused
on addressing the technical issues surrounding the
design, piloting, and full implementation of the
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new assessments and did not see it as their job to
defend the assessments or standards politically. In
general, the national organizations seem to feel that
communications work should be done by state and
local agencies, while the state and local folks felt
that it should be the responsibility of the national
organizations. In addition, arguments against
the Common Core (and the groups making them)
varied widely, making it difficult to develop a single
response (Williams, 2014).

Much of the communications done by Core
proponents has been passive or reactive. While
advocacy groups developed informational
materials, tool kits, and web sites that touted the
benefits of the Common Core, they often didn’t
actively push that message out to schools and
communities. Much of the messaging responded to
attacks on the Core rather than proactively making
the case for it.

RISING OPPOSITION
During the latter part of 2013 and early 2014 there
was a palpable sense that the tide was beginning
to turn against the CCSS—in polling, media and
talk shows—and defections of governors such as
Mike Huckabee and Bobby Jindal. As states moved
toward full implementation of the new standards
and aligned assessments during the 2014-2015
school year, an anti-Common Core coalition gained
strength.
The first organized opposition came from the far
right among media and Tea Party activists. Leftwing activists were next to organize, particularly
inside teacher advocacy groups and unions. As
less-political parent opposition gravitated to these
groups, the issue moved rapidly from the margins of
the parties into the mainstream. Some objections to
the Common Core were shared across ideologies: a
perception that the standards took a one-size-fits-all
approach, created a de facto national curriculum,
put too much emphasis on standardized tests, might
threaten student privacy, and undermined teacher
autonomy. Moreover, the Common Core was quickly
linked to the emerging anti-testing backlash. While
the Core standards were separate from the new
assessments—states can and have adopted the
Standards but not the tests—they became conflated
in the public mind.
Opinion surveys demonstrate that much
opposition to the Common Core—on both the

@NEWAMERICA

The first organized opposition came
from the far right among media
and Tea Party activists. Left-wing
activists were next to organize,
particularly inside teacher
advocacy groups and unions.
right and the left—is based on misinformation
or misunderstanding. For example, only half of
Americans who have heard of the Core understand
that states and local school districts retain the
ability to choose their own educational materials
(Henderson et al., 2015). Advocates have struggled
to combat the volume and speed of opponents’
messaging on social media where information
(and misinformation) is disseminated rapidly and
widely. Groundbreaking research on Common
Core social media has revealed that a handful of
individuals are creating many groups and most of
the content, and there is neither real debate over the
standards nor communication between supporters
and opponents (Supovitz, Daly, & del Fresno, 2015).
Instead, social media serves as an echo chamber in
which opponents talk to opponents and supporters
to supporters.
Core advocates have struggled to articulate a clear,
consistent, and convincing rationale for how the
standards will improve American education. They
focused initially on communicating with political
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elites in order to get the Core adopted and to protect
it from repeal attempts in state legislatures. Then
they focused on communicating with teachers
and administrators to assist with implementation.
Advocates did not turn their attention to the public
until much later and, as a result, allowed opponents
to negatively define the Core for far too long.
Common Core advocates also have been challenged
by the tremendous turnover among governors,
legislators, and state superintendents. Officials
who initially made the decision to adopt the Core
are no longer in office, replaced by politicians
less supportive or less invested in its success.1
This problem was exacerbated by the Republican
electoral landslide in the November 2014 elections,
during the first full year of implementation and
testing. With those invested officials gone, the
weaknesses of the “under the radar” strategy
became more visible. The speed and process by

which states adopted the Common Core and took
on the Race to the Top application process without
much public discussion or debate, though it initially
seemed so effective, would ultimately generate
anger, resentment, and a perception of subterfuge
which crossed party lines. A co-founder of the
anti-Core Badass Teachers Association called them
the “stealth standards,” while Jamie Gass, the
Director of the Center for School Reform at Pioneer
Institute (a leading anti-Core group), notes: “In
hindsight we know that the Obama administration
and the players from D.C. that were in favor of this
were really trying to pull a fast one. And that is
what has animated a lot of the opposition; and
it really cuts across the political spectrum.”
But the left and right anchors of the backlash had
other, profoundly different, objections; what is
more, they do not agree on a “fix” to the Common
Core, much less broader education policy.

GROWING CONSERVATIVE RESISTANCE
Tea Party adherents and others on the right
view the Common Core as a dangerous—even
unconstitutional—expansion of federal control
into education and a violation of states’ rights.
Beginning with the passage of No Child Left Behind
(NCLB) in 2001, the federal role in education
has grown tremendously and, like the law itself,
has become more controversial. The Obama
administration’s use of the Race to the Top grant
competition and NCLB waiver application process
to encourage states to adopt the standards, and
its funding of the two consortia that developed

Tea Party adherents and others
on the right view the Common
Core as a dangerous—even
unconstitutional—expansion of
federal control into education and
a violation of states’ rights.

the aligned assessments, have fed concerns that
Uncle Sam is becoming the national schoolmarm.
This involvement, along with the Obama
administration’s vocal support for the Core, has
made it easy for opponents to cast it as a federal
initiative.
Opposition grew among conservatives after a
number of conservative talk show hosts (such
as Glenn Beck) and national conservative
organizations (including Heritage, Cato, Americans
for Prosperity, Freedom Works, American Principles
Project, and Pioneer Institute) began to publicize
their opposition, fund ad campaigns, and mobilize
activists. As Jamieson and Cappella noted in their
2008 book Echo Chamber, conservative talk radio
has come to play a central role in setting the agenda
for the Republican Party.2 Journalist Tim Murphy’s
analysis found that “when states began to move
forward with the implementation…Common Core
fast became a tea party cause célèbre…the reform
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was viewed as yet another prong of Obama’s
devious master plan, one aided and abetted by a
sinister group of politicians and businessmen.”3

In the aftermath of the 2012
Supreme Court decision, which
largely put an end to the effort to
roll back the Affordable Care Act,
conservative commentators and
organizers seized on the Common
Core and the federal role in
education as the primary focus of
their anti-Obama animus.
Opposition to the Core also represented a rejection
of establishment Republican cooperation with
Democrats, and a political style of complete
opposition to big government.4 In the aftermath of
the 2012 Supreme Court decision, which largely put
an end to the effort to roll back the Affordable Care
Act, conservative commentators and organizers
seized on the Common Core and the federal role
in education as the primary focus of their antiObama animus. The fight against “Obamacare”
transitioned into the fight against “Obamacore.”
Some conservative organizations, such as Freedom
Works, the American Principles Project, and Pioneer
Institute, have also used opposition to the Common
Core to attract new members and donations.5 A few
Republican candidates used the issue as well during
the 2014 elections to rally support, as did some 2016
presidential contenders, particularly Louisiana Gov.
Bobby Jindal and New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie,
both former Core supporters.6
Jane Robbins, Senior Fellow at the American
Principles Project, described the Core as an “attempt
to centralize control over education so that we have
one set of standards which inevitably leads to one
curriculum or curriculums that are very similar
to each other and ideally one set of assessment or
assessments that are all very similar to each other.
It reduces parental autonomy and control over their

@NEWAMERICA

children’s education.” She added that “certainly
the movement started among groups that would be
considered more conservative, but it’s not confined
to that at all…there are a lot of groups that in no
way could be described as conservative who are
quite as upset about this as people on the other side
of the aisle. It’s primarily parent groups that have
started the movement to stop Common Core and it’s
through those groups that we’ve made the pitch, but
it’s not just to conservatives or to Republicans.”
The crafting of new national standards also
reignited long-standing ideological debates about
religion and multiculturalism, and the teaching
of literature, history, and science.7 Opponents
of the Core cast it as a national curriculum that
is ill-suited to a country with such religious,
political, ethnic, and cultural diversity.8 Christian
conservatives asserted that the Core would result in
the indoctrination of children on such hot-button
issues as homosexuality and socialism. The Family
Research Council, an influential religious-right
group, repeatedly warned about the dangers of the
Common Core and Michael Farris, president of the
Home School Legal Defense Association, stated
that “I just fundamentally don’t believe in using
centralized government standards.”9 Additionally,

The crafting of new national
standards also reignited longstanding ideological debates about
religion and multiculturalism, and
the teaching of literature, history,
and science.
the centralized collection of student information
and test scores collided with heightened fears of
data mining. For example, a 2014 survey by rightleaning Education Next found that 85 perfect of
Americans who have heard of the Common Core
erroneously believe the federal government will
receive detailed data on individual students’ test
performance (Henderson, Peterson, & West, 2015).
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THE PROGRESSIVE BACKLASH
Opponents on the left got organized a bit later than
conservatives—one seminal moment is the 2013
founding of the Badass Teachers Association. In a
2013 interview, co-founder and co-president Mark
Naison emphasized the grassroots nature of the
group, its dependence on social media and protests,
and its work within—but not directly with—teachers

Opposition focused on longstanding concerns of the left:
teacher evaluations, the role of
corporations in education, and the
call for greater focus on underlying
social inequities.
unions. He remarked that: “We don’t raise a cent.
This is all done without any money. We’re not a nonprofit, we don’t collect dues, we don’t get grants. It’s
all social media driven and driven by very smart,
very angry people.” Within a year of its founding,
the group claimed 39,000 members.
Opposition focused on long-standing concerns of
the left: teacher evaluations, the role of corporations
in education, and the call for greater focus on
underlying social inequities.10 The Business
Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
and major corporations such as ExxonMobil, Intel,
and Time Warner Cable have funded Common Core
advocacy campaigns, as have foundations with
close corporate ties, such as the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation. This association of big business
with the Core comes at a time of unprecedented
corporate political contributions and enormous
economic inequality and has raised considerable
suspicion on the left.11 Some argue that the Core
was a scheme intended to increase profits for big
textbook providers (such as Pearson), education
tech companies (such as Microsoft), or test makers
(such as the College Board).12 Still others see

the Core as part of an even larger conspiracy to
dismantle public schools and privatize education
entirely.13 This led critics on the left such as Diane
Ravitch to rail against the Common Core as yet
another nefarious example of “corporate school
reform.”14
As state implementation of the CCSS proceeded,
many teachers became concerned that states were
tying evaluation systems to the new standards and
assessments before the kinks have been ironed
out. They fear this will result in arbitrary or unfair
personnel decisions. A 2014 Gallup poll found that
76 percent of teachers continued to support the
goals of the Common Core, but only 27 percent
supported using computerized tests to measure
student performance, and only 9 percent supported
using those test scores to evaluate teachers (Lyons,
2014). At its 2015 convention, the NEA formally
adopted resolutions in support of the testing
opt-out movement and in opposition to the use of
Common Core aligned tests to evaluate teachers
or rate schools.15 APP’s Robbins noted that the
teachers’ unions and conservatives look at these
issues from a different perspective. “The teachers’
unions really are being pulled into it because of the
teacher-evaluation part—the high-stakes testing,
basing teacher evaluations on the test scores, tying
everything to the test results. But although many
conservatives also question the appropriateness
of this type of teacher evaluation, that’s not the
primary focus of what we’re doing—we are focused
more on parental rights and local control.”
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CCSS proceeded, many teachers
became concerned that states
were tying evaluation systems
to the new standards and
assessments before the kinks have
been ironed out.
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Finally, many left activists argue that the Common
Core movement misses the mark because it does not
address the underlying social inequities at the root
of educational performance gaps. Thus, the debate
over the Common Core became entangled with
long-standing liberal concerns that governments

are not doing enough to address poverty, safety,
health, and other out-of-school factors affecting
student achievement, and that teachers lack
sufficient training and resources to meet the needs
of disadvantaged students.

HINTS OF A TRANSPARTISAN COALITION
While conservatives and progressives emphasized
different reasons for their opposition to Common
Core, their shared concerns and shared goal of
repeal seemed to offer coalition potential. National
organizations like Freedom Works and Heritage on
the right, and Save Our Schools and the NEA on
the left, began to produce and disseminate videos,
research briefs, talking points, and even full length
movies (as was the case of Glenn Beck’s “We Will
Not Conform” film which appeared in theaters
across the country). In many states, teachers unions
and conservative organizations joined grassroots
anti-Common Core groups in calling for legislation
to repeal the standards and/or delay the stakes for
teachers and students connected to test scores.
But outside of the lobbying in state legislatures,
the real anti-Common Core action was grassroots,
with much of the communication occurring through
social media such as Facebook, You Tube, and
Twitter (Supovitz, Daly, Del Fresno, 2015). Pioneer’s
Gass remarked that “It’s been really a loose coalition
of folks. It hasn’t had the same kind of top-down
structure or centralized coordination that I think the
other side has had…it wasn’t a coalition of people
on the two ends of the political spectrum, but there
was broad, pretty deep opposition to Common Core,
to PARCC and SBAC, a lot of the components of Race
to the Top…it’s hard to really pigeon-hole the antiCommon Core audience to just one political stripe or
another.”
Andrea Neal, a former Indiana state school
board member, observed that “I certainly have
seen a strange alliance between Tea Party type
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conservatives and more liberal progressive
education reformers, in that both seem to favor
more local control. So it’s not a clean Republican/
Democrat/Conservative/Liberal breakdown at
all. It’s more about who decides what goes on in
our schools.” Mark Naison, a liberal social justice
activist, Fordham professor of African American

While conservatives and
progressives emphasized different
reasons for their opposition
to Common Core, their shared
concerns and shared goal of repeal
seemed to offer coalition potential.
studies, and co-founder of the Badass Teachers
Association has remarked that “Never have I found
myself finding so much common ground with
people who call themselves conservatives and
libertarians—we all agreed public schools were
going to be ruined by this. This really represents
the worst fantasies of both the right and the left
coming true: Big Government and Big Corporations
imposing this terrible, untested, expensive plan
using intimidation and bullying.”16
While individuals from across the political spectrum
united in opposition to the Core and formed new
grassroots groups, there does not appear to have
been much direct communication or coordination
between established state or national organizations
such as Tea Party groups and teachers unions.
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Opposition appears to have begun in a purely
partisan way among conservatives and then
developed support on the other side. There was
little engagement between different groups of
opponents. For example, analysis of twitter

data focusing on the hasthtag commoncore
(#commoncore) from 2013-2014 showed three
distinct sub-communities of supporters of the CCSS,
opponents inside education, and opponents outside
of education (Supovitz, Daly, Del Fresno, 2015).

Figure 1
Transpartisan Debate about #commoncore on Twitter,
September 2013-February 2014
Supporters

Opponents within education

Opponents outside education

Source: #commoncore Project,
http://www.hashtagcommoncore.com
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A close examination of two of the more prominent
Common Core battleground states, Indiana and
Oklahoma, reveals how transpartisan collaboration

aided Core opponents but also how quickly that
partnership hit its limits.

INDIANA CASE STUDY:
FLEETING TRANSPARTISANSHIP,
SYMBOLIC VICTORY
Indiana was the first state to officially drop out of
Common Core and PARCC. The opposition was led
by a group called Hoosiers against Common Core,
which identified its sole purpose as “to have the
adoption of Common Core reversed and end the
new PARCC test.” Its aims offered a mix of liberal
and conservative touchstones: “restore local
control of education, restore quality standards,
restore the right of teachers to practice their craft,
and reduce the power of standardized testing.”17
Erin Tuttle, one of the co-founders of the group,
recalled her shock on discovering that a state
voucher law requiring private schools to offer state
assessments had led her son’s private Catholic
school to adopt Common Core. She remarked that
“When we found out the switch to Common Core
was due to the adoption of national standards,
we were unaware new standards were even in
place. There was no public notice. The schools
made this big shift for the worse and parents were
upset. That’s how I got involved.” Former Indiana
school board member Andrea Neal said, “Indiana’s
effort was extremely homegrown. I’m not aware of
outsiders coming in to organize, that’s for sure. I
believe Indiana’s opposition to Common Core really
bubbled up from the parents.”
Tuttle brought her concerns to state legislator Gus
Schneider; she reports that he also was unaware
that the state had adopted the national standards.
He agreed to put forth legislation to repeal the
Common Core. After it was defeated in committee,
the emerging grassroots group swung into action.
Tuttle described the Hoosiers group as “a huge
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group of parents who hosted rallies, invited people
to come. We crisscrossed the state and spoke at
different events: political groups, church groups,
parent groups, and some were just at personal
homes. We started a website called Hoosiers against
the Common Core, just to put that information out
there. People would see our site and call us and
we would come out. It really was a diverse group
of parents. The most common denominator of
the parents was that they were highly educated
and involved with their child’s work.” The group
depended heavily on social media—because it was
free and, in Tuttle’s words, “a lot of parents, a lot of
mothers, are on Facebook.”
She notes that the group reached out to several
national conservative organizations such as the
Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the
American Principles Project and academic experts
such as Bill Evers of the Hoover Institute, and two
dissenting Common Core Validation Committee
members Sandra Stotsky and James Milgram, to
gather information “so that we felt comfortable in
our own understanding of what the issues were.”
She utilized the “Truth in American Education”
website for the exchange of information about
Common Core and the different battles in different
states.
While Tuttle encountered many individual teachers
who opposed the Common Core, she reported the
group had no assistance from any type of teachers
union. Neal added that teachers unions and Tea
Party conservatives “never really joined forces
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here.” The Indiana Star concluded that a “tide of
grassroots opponents—many fueled by President
Barack Obama’s endorsement of Common Core
turned key lawmakers from supporters into foes
intent on dumping the guidelines.”18
The key players crossed party lines. Hoosiers
against the Common Core did not oppose
Republican Tony Bennett, a strong supporter of the
Core during his campaign for re-election as state
superintendent in 2012. But after his Democratic
opponent Glenda Ritz, a former school librarian,
teachers’ union president, and passionate
opponent of the national standards, pulled off a
surprise upset of Bennett, she joined forces with
Governor Mike Pence—a former member of the Tea
Party Caucus in Congress—to lead the effort for
repeal. In 2013, the state legislature paused Core
implementation and required the state board of
education to adopt new standards.
While much has been made of Indiana’s formal
“repeal” of the standards, it is important to assess
what did and did not change. The law required
that the CCSS be used as the “base model” for the
new standards (so that the state would remain
eligible for federal funds) and experts who have
compared the “new” Indiana standards to the
Common Core have found them to be extremely
similar. Hoosiers against the Common Core’s
Tuttle acknowledges this with frustration: “The
[legislation] was successful—at least in repealing
it by law. However, having the State Department of

Education properly implement the law is another
issue. They basically rewrote our “new” standards
to be just like Common Core. Unfortunately, Indiana
still has Common Core.” Neal, the state school
board member, seconds this view: “I thought we
were actually going to replace the Common Core
with something better and something home grown,
and all we did was rebrand the Common Core…
So somehow we pretended to rewrite the Common
Core and get credit for rewriting the Common Core
when we didn’t actually do that.” Neal believes
the grassroots anti-Common Core effort has run its
course, and, while she thinks the standards will
ultimately be repealed, “I think that we lost so
soundly that it’s very difficult to keep fighting.”
The political alliance between the Republican
governor and the Democratic superintendent
dissolved quickly and spectacularly after the
“repeal” of CCSS. One analysis noted that “the
issues on which Pence and Ritz spar are many—
from school grading and teacher evaluations to
school funding and charter schools” and that
their “mutual support for new state standards has
not translated to cooperation in other areas. As
soon as the standards issue was over, Pence and
Ritz immediately returned to a significant level
of discord and criticism of each other.”19 Another
observer noted: “at their core, Ritz and Pence
disagree about education.”20 The transpartisan
coalition in Indiana proved fleeting and had little
long-term impact on educational politics or policy
in the state.

OKLAHOMA CASE STUDY: REPUTATIONAL
TRANSPARTISANSHIP
Oklahoma is another case where transpartisanship
seems like it might have played an important role
in repeal of the Core. There, opposition was led by
a group—Restore Oklahoma Public Education—that
had originally been created in 2009 as a watchdog
of public education for tax payers and parents. The

group’s president, Jenni White, recalls that she
learned the state had adopted Common Core while
she was researching a tax initiative. “When I saw
the part about Common Core, it really kind of stuck
in my craw because to me standards were local.”
White notes that “initially, our target audience was
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legislators because they were the ones who actually
enacted the law without informing anybody. I
mean they didn’t have a clue what they were doing.
They just wanted to get federal money and sign up
for it. But then we realized after three years that
they weren’t going to budge on any of this, and we
started going directly to parents.”
The group used social media, email lists, surveys,
petitions, and lobbying, “and then I just literally
put many thousands of miles on my car driving
around Oklahoma and talking to people, about this
and what was actually going on at the federal level
in education.” While she saw some Democratic
opposition to the Core, White remarked that “it
really was this primarily Republican-led movement”
and that “most of the people that were interested
were the Republican groups in our state.” She
said: “I never did get calls from more Left-wing
groups, or I would’ve gone. I never had a problem
talking to anybody about it. But the fact that it’s an
Obama administration initiative—the Democrats are
naturally going to side with the President on that.”
Like Hoosiers against Common Core, Restore
Oklahoma Public Education partnered with a
variety of conservative national organizations,
including Truth in American Education21, the
American Principles Project, the Pioneer Institute,
and the Eagle Forum. National groups did
not provide financial support, nor were there
coordination meetings or conference calls. Rather,
they were clearinghouses for information that could
be passed along to parents and legislators. When
asked whether her group partnered with the state’s
teacher unions, White replied:
Well, I wouldn’t say we were in partnership
with them. For the most part we didn’t do
anything with them because they were
either pro-Common Core or they were
neutral, or they were just more concerned
about testing than they were about
Common Core. So we didn’t really have any
common ground with them. Every once in
a while they published something about
testing that had a good solid message that
we agreed with.
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As in Indiana, the Oklahoma anti-Common Core
forces were successful in securing passage of a
bill (in 2014) that “repealed” the standards. But
the state Department of Education rejected a plan
to return to the state’s old standards,22 there are
concerns that the state’s new standards closely
resemble the Common Core, and teachers and
administrators who spent years training to adjust
their curricula and pedagogy to the Core have been
resistant to replacing it.23 White acknowledges that
“We’re kind of heading in the Indiana direction
with the standards rewrite. And that’s certainly
very frustrating for us. And we’ve been putting
out as much information as we possibly can on
it. But at this point the legislators and the general
public think to themselves, ‘Wow, hey, Common
Core is repealed. I’m going back to sleep.’ I mean,
it’s done for them—so engagement is always such
a challenge when you’re trying to do anything
politically.” The Oklahoma case demonstrates
that while the anti-Common Core movement often
attracted some liberal individuals to the cause, it
was nonetheless a primarily (and organizationally)
Republican-led effort.
The Indiana and Oklahoma case studies reveal that
the “success” of the anti-Common Core coalition in

The Indiana and Oklahoma case
studies reveal that the “success”
of the anti-Common Core coalition
in these states—as well as in many
others—has been overstated.
these states—as well as in many others—has been
overstated. Nonetheless, the “scope of conflict”
around Common Core has clearly expanded
dramatically over the past two years across the
country with extensive media coverage and a large
and diverse array of actors engaging on the issue.
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THE BLOWBACK GOES NATIONAL
While the effort to roll back the Common Core at
the state level was in many places stymied—or
resulted in only symbolic victories, as in Indiana
and Oklahoma—those very defeats encouraged the
opposition to take their fight to the national level.
In the wake of the “rebranding” of Common Core in
Indiana, Tuttle says that Hoosiers against Common
Core has “changed our strategy to direct more
attention at federal policies because they control
every aspect of state policy. We focused on the reauthorization of No Child Left Behind. We wanted
to get to the point where the U.S. Department of
Education didn’t have as much influence over
standards, assessments, and state education policy
setting, and return that power back to the state
level. The bureaucracy of the federal government
has become unwieldy, and despite the hype in
D.C., the passage of ESSA will do nothing to curtail
it.” It is too early to ascertain the role that antiCommon Core groups played in the December

2015 passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act,
which replaced NCLB and significantly reduced the
federal role in education. It appears likely, however,
that the centrist bipartisan coalition that came
together to enact ESSA might not have emerged
without the presence of transpartisan pressure from
the ideological extremes of the Republican and
Democratic parties.
While many have been quick to declare that ESSA
amounts to a death knell for Common Core, it
is important to note that the law itself doesn’t
automatically repeal the Core in the states--it just
prohibits the federal government from mandating
or incentivizing states to adopt/maintain the
standards in the future. Whether individual states
that have already adopted the Common Core (the
majority) end up dropping it will ultimately come
down to the state level political dynamics discussed
here.

CONCLUSION
Views on the potential of transpartisan coalitions
such as those that emerged around Common Core
vary widely. As one optimistic observer noted,
“Unlike bipartisanship, which often takes two
existing viewpoints and, effectively, splits the
difference, transpartisanship encourages solutions
that can align with many viewpoints…Passion,
deftly deployed, is actually an effective political
took with which to advance good ideas. That’s the
promise of transpartisanship.”24 Others, however,
believe that “it remains an open question whether
transpartisanship can really suffice as an alternative
to bipartisan problem solving” and emphasize the
“issue-specific, time-limited, and thereby fleeting
if not fickle nature of transpartisan coalitions.”25
We see the ideological orthodoxy that fuels the

passion of different factions in a transpartisan
coalition to be a fundamental constraint because
acknowledging the legitimacy of opponents reduces
one’s standing amongst fellow members of the
same ideological stripe. In the case of the Common
Core, transpartisanship seemed like children from
very different backgrounds parallel playing in the
same sandbox. While they may have shared some
of the same toys (i.e. arguments), when it comes to
envisioning a different playground, they have little
common ground for building a solution together.
The longer no alternative vision to the existing
common standards emerges, the less likely we are
to see a course shift. The more time that states have
adopted the Common Core standards, the less likely
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they will drop them. State governments, school
administrators, and teachers have already invested
a tremendous amount of time, effort, and money
in implementing the Core and re-aligning their
education systems around the new standards and
assessments.26 These represent “sunk costs” that
cannot be recouped if a state changes direction.
The replacement of the Core with something truly
different would require significant new investment
to develop. As a result, states are likely to become
increasingly “path dependent” with regard to the
Core.27 These dynamics mean that large numbers
of states are unlikely to repeal the Core and that
even in those states that do, many (like Indiana
and Pennsylvania) are likely to simply rename
their standards or adopt a slightly modified
version. Despite the extensive media coverage, ad
campaigns, social media activity, and legislative
repeal efforts, as of spring 2015, 40 of the original
45 states that adopted the Common Core remained
committed to them.
As we have already seen, however, it is more
likely that states will pull out of the two major
assessment consortium (PARCC and SBAC), which
may ultimately constrain the impact that the
new standards can have on American education.
Pioneer’s Jamie Gass notes that “The major goal
of the Common Core is to have a unified set of
nationalized standards and tests. More states
are now not in the testing consortia than are
in the consortia so the commonality and the
comparability across states is gone.” As of July 2015,
about half of the states had withdrawn from the
test consortia and states witnessed unprecedented

rates of students opting out of tests during the
2014-2015 academic year. Opposition to high stakes
standardized testing mobilized opposition among
parents—and particularly influential suburban
parents—in a way that concern about standards did
not.
Nonetheless, while the Common Core “brand”
has been damaged, surveys show that support
for the idea of national standards remains strong
among teachers and the general public.28 Thus, the
brand of the Common Core may fade, even while
the concept of standards-based reform persists. In
addition, in the past year several steps have been
taken to address the other sources of controversy
that have been connected to the Common Core. The
testing consortia and state leaders have announced
plans to reduce the amount of testing students will
have to undertake; many states have announced
a pause or postponement in the use of test scores
in teacher evaluations; and the new Every Student
Succeeds Act explicitly bans the federal government
from mandating/incentivizing states to adopt the
Common Core.
Over time—as states persist with their
implementation efforts—students, teachers, and
parents are likely to become more accustomed
to the new standards. As a result, predictions
of the demise of the Common Core—and the
ability of a transpartisan coalition to bring them
down—are likely overblown.29 There has been less
transpartisan engagement around the Common
Core than might appear to be the case, and the
victories that anti-Common Core forces have won
have often been more symbolic than substantive.

LESSONS
Several lessons about transpartisan politics can be
gleaned from the Common Core story.
First, “empty vessel” issues may enable
transpartisanship. The Common Core debate
served as a petri dish for a wide variety of concerns
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and deeply held beliefs about public education,
including the role of the federal government and
corporate America, the increasing prominence of
testing and external accountability, and technology
and data privacy issues. The nature of standards
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as a broad lever for change also meant that it
was connected to so many aspects of education
that there was ample room for opponents to find
common cause without sharing particular issues
or concerns. Core proponents seem not to have
anticipated the range and depth of American
anxieties – across the political spectrum and among
apolitical parents – the reforms would evoke.
Second, transpartisan initiatives may be more
likely to arise from policy opposition than policy
creation. The early phase of the Common Core
Standards movement was notable for its carefully
crafted bipartisan approach. The developers of the
standards and their advocates took great pains
to create broad support and to avoid the stigma
of federal control by working through the CCSSO
and NGA to brand the standards as state-led. The
economic recession, the federal stimulus package,
and the opportunistic way in which the RTTT
incented rapid standards adoption, however, undid
much of the groundwork paved by the decentralized
strategy of the common standards.
The left-right opposition had very divergent visions
for education. Conservatives and progressives
disagree about the proper role of government and
public policy versus markets, and particularly about
the appropriate role of the federal government vis a
vis the states. On most economic and social policy
issues, Tea Party Republicans and progressive
Democrats literally could not be further apart.
Within the education arena, the conservative
education agenda is to abolish the U.S. Department
of Education, reduce education spending, expand
market-based reforms such as private school
vouchers, and weaken (or abolish) collective
bargaining and teachers unions. Teachers unions
do not support policies that would weaken their
own power and job protections, and progressives
typically embrace a more robust federal role in
education and increased education spending, and
vehemently oppose vouchers.30
The anti-Core groups shared few if any positive
goals, and they put little or no effort into
dismantling the extreme hostility and distrust

between them. Those at the ideological wings of
both political parties tend to emphasize ideological
purity, which in practice makes them less willing
to compromise, but it is compromise which is the
grease of policy creation. Transpartisan efforts that
are pure alliances of convenience, with little to no
shared strategy and infrastructure behind them,
may be highly effective for delaying, diminishing or
derailing policies—but are ineffective at enacting
policies.
Third, transpartisanship may be more likely when
there is no dominant message associated with
an issue, and it is not associated with a particular
political axis. The early bipartisan, below-the-radar
strategy of the Core advocates made the standards
vulnerable. They failed to control and cement the
dominant message about the standards while the
space was uncontested. While standards are a fairly
abstract and technical issue and thus are hard to
message, there was little coordination amongst
advocacy groups supporting the Core and funders
who were supporting their adoption in the states.
This left the door open for opponents to paint the
issue in their own terms.
Additionally, the Common Core was the first major
education issue to play out in the new landscape
of social and alternative media. Anti-Core activists
used these new tools effectively; Core proponents
did not. The American Principles Project’s Robbins
described the “huge” role of social media in this
rise of opposition to the Common Core: “You get
a group of parents together and they put up a
Facebook page and things kind of takeoff from
there. Twitter, Facebook have gotten the word
out more so than it would have been possible
otherwise…It’s the lifeblood of the movement.”
Transpartisan opponents of the Core were far more
effective in their use of social media to mobilize
their supporters and influence the political process
than were advocates. Whether policy advocates and
funders seek to mobilize or neutralize these forces,
they will need to prioritize longer-term planning
for implementation, public communication, and
analysis of grassroots political forces at the local
and national level.
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Fourth, we may experience forms of
transpartisanship in which groups at the
ideological poles are partners without even
communicating with each other. Sharing a
common goal can be sufficient for transpartisanship
to arise. In fact, the necessity of speaking to one’s
base risks that acts of coordination are seen
as consorting with the opposition. In this way
opposition to the Common Core was very much
like the left and the right parallel playing in the
education sandbox. In transpartisan parallel play,
the objective may be similar, but the arguments
are very different. In this case, the arguments used
by opponents on the right included intrusion of
the federal government on state’s rights and local
control and fear of data collection and privacy
infringement. On the left, opposition to the
standards was driven by objection to encroachment
on teacher autonomy (anti-teacher evaluation),
protests over the monetization of education, and
anti-testing sentiment. Common goals do not
necessarily mean common ground.
Fifth, outspoken presidential support for a policy
can polarize an issue. As Smith and Seltzer (2015)
have noted, twentieth century presidents have
become very polarizing figures—particularly during
periods of divided government. In this context,
the bully pulpit is often counter-productive as
presidents who publicly endorse a particular policy
may succeed in mobilizing the opposition even
more than they mobilize supporters. Hess (2014) has
suggested that the Core might have had a different
political trajectory if advocates had not pushed for
rapid universal adoption “tainted” by federal and
corporate endorsement, but rather had started in
a smaller number of states that were genuinely
enthusiastic about it, and let it spread over time to
others as a result of proven success.
Finally, transpartisanship’s influence seems
strongest at producing pressure at the
agenda setting stage rather than at the policy
construction stage. The grassroots backlash
against the Common Core put pressure on
establishment policymakers to respond—to do
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something—but they were less able to influence
the content of the actual response. This led
establishment interests to respond with largely
toothless or symbolic policy—such as states
renaming the Common Core without significantly
changing the standards themselves.31 Similarly at
the national level, while Core opponents succeeded
in getting language included in the Every Student
Succeeds Act that prevents the federal government
from pressuring states in any way on national
standards, the ultimate impact of this provision
remains questionable. Diverse grassroots coalitions
of the sort that arose in opposition to Common Core
typically do not have the infrastructure, resources,
or staying power to exert long-term influence.
Transpartisan initiatives have longer-range staying
power ONLY when they either entail significant
contact and deliberate effort to develop ways of
working together OR when the attention they garner
mobilizes mainstream or elite actors – as in the
case of anti-testing backlash moving into influential
suburban school districts.

Transpartisanship’s influence
seems strongest at producing
pressure at the agenda setting
stage rather than at the policy
construction stage.
In sum, the Common Core issue provided fertile
ground for transpartisan opponents to come
together to raise concerns about an essentially
centralized standards reform movement in the
traditionally decentralized education terrain.
However, because the transpartisan coalition
lacked shared perspectives about the nature of the
problem, when it came to seeking alternatives, the
coalition proved to be built on quicksand.
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